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#2A-9/17/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. 
Charging Party. 
-and- • CASE NO. U-8 922 
CITY OF BUFFALO (POLICE DEPARTMENT). 
Respondent. 
DIXON. DE MARIE & SCHOENBORN. P.C. (ANTHONY J. DE MARIE. 
ESQ.. of Counsel), for Charging Party 
SAMUEL F. HOUSTON. ESQ. (FLORA MILLER SLIWA. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
LOUIS N. KASH. CORPORATION COUNSEL (BARRY K. WATKINS. 
) ESQ.. of Counsel) for City of Rochester. Amicus Curiae 
HARVEY and HARVEY. MUMFORD & KINGSLEY (JAMES B. TUTTLE. 
ESQ.. of Counsel) for Police Conference of New York. 
Inc., Amicus Curiae 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City 
of Buffalo [Police Department] (City) to an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) decision which found that the City had 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally ordered 
probationary police officers represented by the Buffalo 
Police Benevolent Association (PBA) to submit to random drug 
testing. In essence, the ALJ held that, whether random drug 
"s testing constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure 
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prohibited by the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and/or the New York State Constitution, or (if 
random drug testing is not unconstitutional) whether a 
balancing test between the employer's interest in a drug 
free environment and the employee's interest in protection 
of his privacy applies, the result is the same: an employer 
may not unilaterally impose a random drug testing program on 
its employees, whether probationary or permanent. Because 
the ALJ found that random testing is unconstitutional, 
however, he concluded that it is a permissive subject of 
bargaining only, subject to the consent of the employees' 
bargaining agent. The agent can properly refuse, under the 
Act, to engage in negotiations leading to waiver of a 
constitutional right, but has the power to do so if it deems 
appropriate. As a result of his holding, the ALJ directed 
return to the status quo and the reinstatement with back pay 
and benefits of an employee terminated pursuant to the 
unilaterally imposed random drug testing procedure. The 
City excepts to the holdings of the ALJ in virtually all 
respects. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the spring of 1986, the PBA, which represents City 
police officers, and the City commenced negotiations for a 
successor agreement to their then-existing agreement. 
During the course of negotiations, the City proposed a new 
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contractual provision which would authorize the Police 
Commissioner to order any unit employee to submit to testing 
to determine whether the employee was under the influence of 
alcohol or controlled substances. On August 28, 1986, it 
withdrew that proposal, and, on the following day, the 
Police Commissioner issued a directive, ordering all 
probationary police officers to submit to drug testing. The 
directive provides that all probationary employees will be 
required to submit, without advance notice, to drug testing, 
and that a positive test results in dismissal. Refusal to 
submit to testing will, according to the directive, 
constitute grounds for dismissal. In a September 24, 1986 
letter further explaining the directive, the Police 
Commissioner stated that testing would be performed at least 
twice during the probationary term by urine sample, which 
"is to be done with as much consideration as possible to 
avoid embarrassing the individual being tested, while 
maintaining observation and chain of evidence control." 
Following institution of the drug testing program, one 
probationary officer, as a result of the test, was dismissed 
from his employment. The instant improper practice charge 
ensued. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Review of ALJ Holding 
When the ALJ issued his decision on March 30. 1987, the 
) 
New York Court of Appeals had not yet ruled on the question 
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Board - U-8922 -4 
of whether random drug testing for governmental employees was 
a constitutionally permissible practice. Shortly after the 
ALJ issued his decision, the Court of Appeals ruled on the 
question, at least in part, in Matter of Patchoque-Medford 
Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education of the 
Patchoque-Medford Union Free School District, 70 N.Y.2d 57. 
June 9, 1987. In that case, the Court of Appeals held that a 
school district policy compelling all probationary teachers 
to submit to urinalysis to determine potential drug abuse 
constituted an illegal search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and under 
Article I, §12 of the New York State Constitution. This 
holding is, we believe, dispositive of a number of the issues 
raised by the City in its exceptions and brief to this Board. 
For example, the City excepted to the finding of the ALJ 
that it has been "clearly" established that "random drug 
testing . . . infringes upon employees' constitutional 
rights." (p. 6 of ALJ decision). Whether the law of the 
State of New York was clear at the time the ALJ decision was 
issued or not, it is now manifestly clear, based upon the 
ruling of the highest court of this State, that random drug 
testing, at least of teachers, does indeed infringe upon 
employees' constitutional right to protection from 
unreasonable searches and seizures under the United States 
11149 
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and New York State Constitutions. Based upon the holding of 
the Court of Appeals in Patchoque-Medford we conclude that 
in the State of New York, random testing for drugs of 
governmental employees is unconstitutional.-
Accordingly, the ALJ's holding is affirmed in this regard. 
Furthermore, because the Court of Appeals held that the 
constitutional protection afforded to probationary teachers 
in Patchoque-Medford derived from the constitutional 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
rather than from a due process right, the status of the 
employees as probationary rather than permanent was 
apparently immaterial. Since the Court of Appeals' ruling 
actually applies to probationary teachers, there appears to 
be no basis for the City's contention that the probationary, 
as compared to permanent, status of the police officers is 
of any significance with respect to the constitutionality of 
random drug testing. 
1/other state and federal courts have also found that 
random drug 'testing is unconstitutional as to governmental 
employees. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police. Newark 
Lodge 12 v. City of New York. NJ Super. Ct.. App. Div. No. 
A-4788-85T5 4/3/87. in which it was held that random testing 
of narcotic bureau officers was unconstitutional; 
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit 
Agency. US DC C Calif. No. 86-8270. 7/7/87. in which the 
District court made a similar finding as to random testing 
of bus drivers and maintenance workers. 
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Having concluded that random drug testing infringes 
upon employees' constitutional rights, it clearly follows 
that waiver of such constitutional rights can only occur 
upon consent. Since the police officers employed by the 
City are represented by a bargaining agent pursuant to the 
Act, the bargaining agent may act in the place of individual 
employees to grant or withhold consent. See Antinore v. 
State of New York. 49 A.D.2d 6, 8 PERB T7513 (4th Dep't 
1975), aff'd. 40 N.Y.2d 921. 9 PERB 1R528 (1976). 
It is our conclusion, however, that a bargaining agent 
cannot be compelled to negotiate concerning a waiver of 
2/ 
constitutionally protected rights.— Thus, the employer 
not only is prohibited from unilaterally engaging in random 
drug testing, but it cannot compel the union to bargain with 
it concerning implementation of random drug testing. The 
issue of random drug testing is, therefore, held to be a 
permissive subject of bargaining: the employer may not 
implement it without negotiation, and the union does not 
have the duty to, but may, negotiate it with the employer. 
2/See New York City Board of Education, 19 PERB 1[3015 
(1986). in which we reviewed several cases dealing with 
various aspects of the effects of statutory and decisional law 
and public policy on the duty to bargain. 
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Turning to the issue of the remedial order recommended 
by the ALJ, we affirm the order of the ALJ which directs the 
reinstatement of the police officer terminated from his 
position as a result of the unilateral implementation of the 
drug testing program. Since a disciplinary penalty of 
termination was imposed pursuant to a procedure which was 
implemented in violation of the Act. reinstatement is the 
appropriate remedy. This is especially so in view of the 
fact that the record does not reveal nor has the City 
asserted any facts as to the work performance of the one 
identified officer who was dismissed which might render 
reinstatement an inappropriate remedy. Accordingly, the 
order of the ALJ is affirmed in this respect also. 
II. Review of Remaining Exceptions 
The City also excepts to the ALJ's comment that "in 
negotiations for prior contracts, the City had also made 
drug testing proposals", contending that there is no 
evidence in the record to support it. However, our review 
of the record indicates that, by letter dated January 21, 
1987, Counsel for the City of Buffalo asserted to the ALJ 
that "attached to the stipulation are Exhibits 'A' and 'B' 
which are copies of proposals the Buffalo Police Department 
has presented through Lt. William J. McLean at previous 
collective bargaining sessions between the PBA and the City 
of Buffalo." In a February 5. 1987 letter confirming the 
11152 
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understandings and agreements of the parties, the ALJ 
stated, without any objection from the parties, that 
"Exhibits A and B which were attached to the stipulation are 
proposals that were put forth by the City of Buffalo during 
previous collective bargaining negotiations between the PBA 
and the City of Buffalo. The PBA never agreed to accept any 
of these proposals and the City of Buffalo ultimately 
dropped them." In view of the stipulations of the parties 
incorporating this correspondence into the record, we find 
that the ALJ's footnote statement is supported by the 
record, and the City's exception in this regard is 
accordingly dismissed. 
The City also excepts to a comment made by the ALJ that 
drug testing is "done, without notice, at least twice during 
the probationary period". Although, as asserted by the 
City, the record shows that the parties stipulated that the 
drug test of August 29, 1986 "was the first time employees 
had ever been ordered to submit to such testing", a 
September 24, 1986 letter to the president of the Buffalo 
PBA from the Commissioner of Police, which is part of the 
record, describes in detail the drug testing procedure 
implemented by the City. In that letter. Commissioner 
Degenhart stated: "At least twice during the Basic Recruit 
Training, the Officer is subjected to drug testing, and he 
may be tested further before the end of his probationary 
11153 
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period, via urine sample." Based upon the foregoing record 
evidence. Exception No. 2 of the City is also dismissed in 
its entirety. 
Exception No. 3 asserts that there is no record 
evidence to support the statement of the ALJ that "the City 
asserts that drug testing goes hand-in-hand with its 
managerial right to discipline its employees for misconduct 
and/or for inability to perform their functions." However, 
the City's answer asserts as an affirmative defense the 
following: "that the Commissioner of Police, Ralph V. 
Degenhart, had the absolute right to order testing of 
probationary police officers, in that he has the absolute 
right to dismiss probationary police officers as he sees fit 
for acts of misconduct and/or the inability of a policeman 
to perform his duties". In our view, the ALJ's decision 
fairly describes the assertions made in the City's answer, 
and in particular, the second affirmative defense contained 
in its answer. Furthermore, a review of the notice issued 
by the police department of the drug testing program clearly 
indicates that the purpose of the drug testing is to 
discipline and discharge employees if the test results are 
positive. The notice of the program provides, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
13154 
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During your recruit training and throughout 
your probationary term, you will be tested, 
without advance notice, to determine if you 
have in fact used drugs. If the tests are 
positive, you will be dismissed. A refusal 
to submit to the testing will be reason for 
dismissal. Any attempt to impede, alter, or 
in any way hamper the testing procedure will 
be basis for dismissal. (See Exhibit B 
annexed to the parties' stipulation of fact 
dated January 6. 1987.) 
It is, based upon the foregoing record evidence, our 
conclusion that the ALJ's characterization of the City's 
position was clearly supported by the record, and the third 
exception to the ALJ decision is accordingly also 
dismissed. Similarly, in light of the foregoing, so much of 
Exception No. 8 as objects to the finding made by the ALJ 
that "the random testing here relates solely to employee 
discipline . . . " is also dismissed. 
The remainder of Exception No. 8 appears to relate to a 
conclusion of law reached by the ALJ that, because the 
testing related "solely to employee discipline", it is 
mandatorily negotiable. However, it is not necessary to 
reach the question of whether the random testing here in 
issue is mandatorily negotiable, because we have determined, 
for the reasons set forth herein, that the unconstitutionality 
of the testing places it in the category of permissive 
subjects of bargaining. Were a final judicial decision to be 
made that random testing as to probationary police officers 
(as compared to probationary teachers) is not unconstitutional 
11155 
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in New York, we would at that point in time consider the 
question of whether the balancing test referred to by the 
ALJ would require a finding that the subject of random 
testing is a mandatory subject of bargaining. In light of 
our reading of the Patchogue-Medford decision, supra, we 
need not reach that issue in this case. 
The remaining exceptions to the ALJ decision, to the 
extent that they are not specifically reviewed here, are 
dismissed. 
Based upon the foregoing, the exceptions filed by the 
City are dismissed and the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS ORDERED, THEREFORE, that the City of Buffalo 
(Police Department): 
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally requiring that 
all probationary police employees submit to drug 
testing; 
2. Immediately remove and destroy all reports and 
documents maintained in City files relating to 
employees who were required to submit to such drug 
testing; 
3. Immediately offer reinstatement to his or her 
former position to any probationary police officer 
who was dismissed from employment as a result of 
such drug testing and pay such officer any lost 
Board - U-8922 -12 
wages and benefits resulting from such dismissal, 
plus interest at the maximum legal rate, less any 
interim outside earnings; 
4. Negotiate in good faith with the Buffalo Police 
Benevolent Association concerning any random drug 
testing program it seeks to implement; and 
5. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: September 17, 1987 
Albany. New York 
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APPENDIX 
NICE 10 M l EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate tha policies of tha 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
wa heraby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Buffalo Police 
Benevolent Association, that the City of Buffalo (Police Department): 
1. Will refrain from unilaterally requiring that all probationary 
police employees submit to drug testing; 
2. Will immediately remove and destroy all reports and documents 
maintained in City files relating to employees who were required 
to submit to such drug testing; 
3. Will immediately offer reinstatement to his or her former position 
to any probationary police officer who was dismissed from employment 
as a result, of such drug testing and pay such officer any lost wages 
and benefits resulting from such dismissal, plus interest at the 
maximum legal rate, less any interim outside earnings; 
4. Will negotiate in good faith with the Buffalo Police Benevolent 





Dated By (Rcprtwntative) (Titlt) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. . 11158 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7618 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION) and OLYMPIC 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, 
Respondents. 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE. ESQ. (JEFFREY G. PLANT, ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
JOSEPH M. BRESS. ESQ. (RICHARD J. DAUTNER. ESQ.. of 
) Counsel), for Respondent State of New York (Department 
of Environmental Conservation) 
RICHARD A. PERSICO, ESQ.. for Respondent Olympic 
Regional Development Authority 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Public 
Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF) to the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing, in its entirety, 
its charge against the State of New York (Department of 
Environmental Conservation) (State) and the Olympic Regional 
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PEF's charge arises out of the transfer of the operation 
and management of the Gore Mountain Ski Center (Gore) from 
the State to ORDA. By its charge, PEF asserts the right to 
continue to represent the job titles at Gore of Ski Center 
Maintenance Supervisor (full-time). Ski Instructor I, II and 
III (seasonal) and Ski School Director (seasonal), which 
titles were included in the Professional, Scientific and 
Technical Unit (PS&T Unit) represented by PEF prior to the 
transfer. 
The charge alleges that the respondents violated 
§§209-a.l(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act): 1) by failing to include the 1982-85 
collective bargaining agreement between the State and PEF in 
the agreement between the State and ORDA transferring the 
operation and management of Gore; 2) in failing to transmit 
to PEF dues and agency fees of the employees PEF asserts the 
right to represent; 3) in redefining the unit designation of 
the ski instructors and reclassifying the full-time position 
of Ski Center Maintenance Supervisor; 4) in refusing to 
recognize and negotiate with PEF as representative of the job 
titles formerly in the PS&T Unit; and 5) in deliberately 
interfering with the rights of PEF and the members of the 
PS&T Unit at Gore. 
11160 
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FACTS 
The parties entered into a stipulation of fact which, 
with certain other stipulated documents, constitutes the 
record in this case. The findings of fact set forth in the 
ALJ's decision are based on the parties' stipulations, and no 
question is raised by PEF in its exceptions regarding those 
findings. Accordingly, we adopt the findings of fact of the 
ALJ. 
Prior to April 1, 1984. the State operated Gore. The 
job titles of Ski Instructor I, II and III, Ski School 
Director and Ski Center Maintenance Supervisor were included 
in the PS&T Unit represented by PEF and were covered by the 
1982-85 collective bargaining agreement between the State and 
PEF. ORDA was created by Chapter 404 of the Laws of 1981 
(codified as Public Authorities Law. Title 28) as a public 
benefit corporation empowered to operate Olympic facilities 
in and around Lake Placid, New York, including the Whiteface 
Mountain Ski Center, the Mount Van Hoevenberg Recreation Area 
and other facilities. ORDA recognized Local 059. Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) as bargaining 
representative of all ORDA employees, including Ski 
Instructor I. II and III and clerical and maintenance 
employees. ORDA and CSEA entered into a collective 
bargaining agreement for the term of January 27, 1984 through 
March 31. 1987. 
1118 
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Pursuant to Chapter 99 of the. Laws of 1984, effective 
April 1, 1984, the State and ORDA entered into an agreement, 
also effective April 1, 1984. transferring the operation, 
maintenance and management of Gore to ORDA. The State 
abolished all full-time titles at Gore, effective March 31. 
1984. Incumbents in the Ski Instructor titles had been 
earlier terminated at the end of the previous ski season. In 
compliance with the enabling legislation, the transfer 
agreement provided that any State employees determined by 
ORDA to be essential to its operations could be transferred 
to comparable civil service positions with ORDA. without 
taking any further examination and with certain retirement 
benefits intact. ORDA hired certain annual salaried 
employees formerly employed by the State, including Richards, 
the former Ski Center Maintenance Supervisor, who was hired 
by ORDA as Mountain Manager, a title whose duties. ORDA 
claims, would warrant managerial designation. During the 
following winter season of 1984-85. ORDA employed at Gore 41 
employees as ski instructors, of whom 36 had been employed by 
the State at Gore during the previous ski season. ORDA 
included all employees hired to work at Gore in the unit 
represented by CSEA, with the exception of the title of 
Mountain Manager. PEF alleges that the duties of Mountain 
Manager are the same as those of Ski Center Maintenance 
111 £0 
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Supervisor, formerly in the PS&T Unit, and that it should be 
grouped with the other former employees from the PS&T Unit. 
Public Authorities Law §2614(2)(c) requires ORDA to 
"comply with all agreements executed by the state affecting 
the...facility existing at the time [of the transfer 
agreement] provided such existing agreements are listed in 
the agreement with the state". The State-PEF 1982-85 
collective bargaining agreement was not one of the agreements 
listed in the transfer agreement. 
ORDA employs approximately 500 employees at Whiteface. 
Gore and the other Olympic facilities in various titles. 
Approximately 46 ski instructors were employed at Gore for 
J the 1985-86 season, and approximately 52 ski instructors were 
employed at Whiteface for the same season. The two 
facilities offer similar services and are located 
approximately one and one-half hours from each other. 
Pursuant to the current ORDA-CSEA contract, all employees 
share in the same salary schedule, leave provisions and other 
benefits, with some seasonal employees receiving a pro rata 
amount of leave. As a public benefit corporation, ORDA is 
granted the power to fix the duties, salaries and benefits of 
its employees. Its personnel functions are managed solely by 
ORDA. and the State exercises no direction or control over 
ORDA employees. 
Board - U-7618 
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PEF never received dues from Richards after the State 
abolished his position. PEF requested dues deductions for 
Richards' title from ORDA and was refused. PEF requested and 
ORDA refused to transmit dues or agency fees for ski 
instructors. PEF demanded negotiations with ORDA regarding 
the former PS&T Unit employees at Gore and ORDA refused. 
ALJ DECISION AND EXCEPTIONS 
All of PEF's claims in this improper practice proceeding 
are based on its assertion of a continuing right to represent 
the PS&T Unit members hired by ORDA when ORDA assumed the 
operation of Gore. In effect. PEF asserts the right to 
represent a unit of ORDA employees consisting of seasonal ski 
instructors and one full-time supervisor employed at Gore. 
In support of its position. PEF argued before the ALJ. and 
argues in its exceptions from the ALJ's decision, that its 
representation and contract rights were not affected by the 
transfer of the Gore operations to ORDA because 1) ORDA is 
acting only as the "agent" of the State in the operation of 
Gore and the employment of the former PS&T Unit members, and. 
as agent and principal. ORDA and the State are required under 
the Taylor Law to continue PEF's representation status and 
comply with the State-PEF contract; or, alternatively. 
2) ORDA should be found to be either the "alter ego" of the 
State or a "successor employer" of the State and. therefore, 
should be obliged to assume the State-PEF contract and 
11164 
^ 
Board - U-7618 -7 
negotiate with PEF concerning terras and conditions of 
employment of the former PS&T Unit members. 
PEF's "agency" argument rests entirely on the decision 
of the Appellate Division. Third Department, in Slutzky v. 
Cuomo.— That decision held that the transfer agreement 
between the State and ORDA constituted ORDA as an agent of 
the State for the operation and management of Gore and was 
not a lease of property in violation of Article XIV. Section 
1 of the State Constitution, which prohibits the leasing of 
"forever wild" sections of the forest preserve. The ALJ 
concluded that the holding in Slutzky was limited to an 
interpretation of the State Constitution and was not 
J dispositive of the issues in this case. The ALJ determined 
that ORDA was a separate public employer under the Act and 
was not the agent of the State for the purposes of the Act. 
The ALJ also determined that, although ORDA was a 
"successor employer" of the State in the operation of Gore, 
ORDA was not obligated to deal with PEF since the unit PEF 
seeks to represent cannot be considered the "most 
appropriate" unit. 
In its exceptions, PEF reiterates the arguments rejected 
by the ALJ. It asserts that the Slutzky decision reguires a 
1 / 1 1 4 A . D . 2 d 116 (3d D e p ' t 1 9 8 6 ) . 
) 
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finding that ORDA is merely the agent of the State in the 
operation of Gore. It urges that the State violated its 
negotiating obligations under the Act when it failed to 
include the State-PEF contract in the agreement transferring 
the operation of Gore to its agent and when it permitted ORDA 
to "destroy" the Taylor Law rights of PS&T Unit members. PEF 
also urges that we should find that ORDA is the successor 
employer of the State and. therefore, is bound to accord PEF 
continuing representation and contract rights. PEF asserts 
2/ that our decision in City of Amsterdam— reguires such a 
holding. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the decision of the ALJ and dismiss PEF's 
charge in its entirety. 
We agree with the ALJ that the decision in Slutzky v. 
Cuomo is not dispositive of the issues raised in this 
proceeding. We are here asked to determine whether, under 
the Taylor Law. the State or ORDA is legally obligated to 
comply with the contract between the State and PEF and to 
recognize and bargain with PEF concerning the terms and 
conditions of employment of the employees formerly in the 
PS&T Unit. For the purposes of other statutes and the State 
2/17 PERB ir3045 (1984). petition to review dismissed. 
17 PERB T7015 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co., 19 84). 
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Constitution, certain public benefit corporations and "state 
3/ 
public authorities"— may be "agents" of the State in the 
performance of their statutory duties. For the purposes of 
the Taylor Law. however, all public benefit corporations and 
public authorities are defined as separate "public 
-jy - - — — _____ —-~ : : ______ 
employers".— The purposes and policies of the Taylor Law 
are best effectuated "if the employees' representatives 
negotiate directly with those who have authority over all the 
5/ 
essential terms of employment".— It is undisputed that 
ORDA now controls all essential terms of employment of the 
former PS&T Unit members. The State exercises no direction 
or control over such matters. In the absence of such 
direction and control, for the purposes of the Taylor Law. 
legal effect cannot be given to the holding that the State is 
the "principal" and ORDA the "agent" in the operation and 
management of Gore. 
PEF asserts that the State, as part of its duty to 
negotiate in good faith, was obligated to insure that its 
"agent". ORDA. honor the 1982-85 State-PEF contract. 
2/See CSL §201.8. 
I/CSL §201.6(a). 
•^Ulster County v. CSEA Unit of Ulster County Sheriff's 
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Otherwise. PEF argues, the State could avoid its bargaining 
and contractual obligations at any time by transferring a 
State function to an agent. 
To the extent that PEF's contention rests on ORDA's 
alleged status as "agent", it must be rejected in light of 
our conclusion that, for the purposes of the Taylor Law, ORDA 
is a separate public employer and not the agent of the State 
regarding the terms and conditions of employment of the 
affected employees. Furthermore, inasmuch as ORDA was 
created by legislative enactment specifically for the purpose 
of operating and managing Gore and other Olympic facilities, 
and the transfer agreement effectuated that statutory 
purpose, we cannot find that the State, as public employer, 
transferred the Gore operation for the purpose of avoiding 
its obligations under the Act. In the absence of such a 
finding, the decision not to include the State-PEF contract 
in the transfer agreement cannot itself be a violation of the 
State's duty to negotiate in good faith. We have previously 
held that an employer is under no mandatory obligation to 
negotiate a demand that it agree to bind a successor employer 
6 / to its collective bargaining agreement.— Under the 
circumstances disclosed by this record, therefore, we 
^Monroe Woodbury Teachers Ass'n, 10 PERB ir3029 (1977). 
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conclude that the State did not violate its bargaining 
obligations under the Act when it determined not to bind ORDA 
7/ to the State-PEF 1982-85 contract.-
For the foregoing reasons, we must also reject PEF's 
claim that ORDA is the "alter ego" of the State and must, 
therefore, be bound by the bargaining obligations of the 
State. 
We come now to PEF's claim that ORDA is a "successor 
employer" of the State in the operation of Gore and, as such, 
should be obligated to negotiate with PEF and assume the 
State-PEF contract. 
The cases are legion in the private sector concerning 
the rights and obligations mandated by the National Labor 
Relations Act when a new employer succeeds an employer who is 
a party to an existing collective bargaining agreement and 
relationship. The U. S. Supreme Court's most significant 
holdings and analyses of the "successor employer" problem are 
found in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 
(1964); NLRB v. Burns International Security Services. 406 
U.S. 272 (1972); Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Joint Board. 
417 U.S. 249 (1974); and, most recently. Fall River Dyeing & 
2/A contrary conclusion would be inconsistent with our 
view of ORDA's obligations under the Act, as hereinafter 
discussed. 
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Finishing Corp. v. NLRB. U.S. (decided June 1, 
1987). Generally, questions regarding the obligations of the 
successor employer fall into two general categories: 1) its 
duty, if any, to continue the substantive provisions of any 
existing or expired agreements which were negotiated by its 
predecessor in interest, and 2) its duty, if any, to continue 
negotiations with the existing negotiating representatives of 
its predecessor's employees. 
In Wiley, the Supreme Court appeared to hold that a 
successor employer could be required to arbitrate a dispute 
arising under the contract entered into by its predecessor. 
The Court subsequently held, however, in Burns, that while a 
company which took over the operation and employees of 
another could be ordered to bargain with the predecessor's 
union, it could not be ordered by the NLRB to assume the 
obligations of the predecessor's collective bargaining 
agreement. Two years later, in Howard Johnson, the Court 
held that where there is a sufficient discontinuity between 
the signatory predecessor employer and the successor, the 
latter is free of any obligation to arbitrate a dispute 
arising under the labor agreement. 
In determining whether a new company is indeed the 
successor to the old for purposes of defining obligations 
under the federal statute, the focus has been on whether 
there is "substantial continuity" between the enterprises. 
Board - U-7618 
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In general, the NLRB and the courts will inquire whether a 
majority of the new employer's employees were employed by the 
old and whether the employees perform substantially the same 
work under the same working conditions. In addition, the 
obligations of successorship must also be predicated on the 
finding that the predecessor's bargaining unit remained 
substantially intact under the successor and continued to be 
an appropriate unit.— 
While we have cited these private sector cases here and 
9/ 
in previous decisions.- we do so only as for the purpose 
of comparison and not because we consider them 
10/ 
controlling.— The results reached in these cases are 
based on the policies of the national labor laws. The 
treatment of the "successor employer" problem under the 
Taylor Law, on the other hand, must be fashioned on the basis 
of the policies and provisions of that Law and other statutes 
relevant to the conduct of the affected public employers. 
In particular, the legal obligations of "successor" 
public employers must be consistent with our long-standing 
ij/NLRB v. Burns, supra; Border Steel Rolling Mills. 
Inc., 204 NLRB 814. 83 LRRM 1606 (1973); NLRB v. 
Security-Columbian Banknote Co., 541 F2d 135, 93 LRRM 2049 
(1976). 
i/see, e.g.. City of Amsterdam. 17 PERB 1P045 (1984); 
Monroe Woodbury Teachers Assn. , 10 PERB 1f3029. 
Wc.S.L. §209-a.3. 
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interpretation of the Act that the criteria set out in CSL 
§207.1 requires us to certify only the "most appropriate" 
units and that these are ordinarily the largest units 
consistent with the Act's standards. 
Furthermore, most successorship questions in the public 
sector arise by virtue of operational changes made pursuant 
to statutory authorization. Transfers, mergers and 
consolidations of governmental operations, made pursuant to 
statute, do not involve policy concerns peculiar to the 
private sector, such as those relating to entrepreneurial 
freedom, transfer of capital and rejuvenation of failing 
businesses, which policies significantly influenced the 
decisions in Burns and Howard Johnson. 
We are persuaded that ORDA's legal obligations, if any, 
to PEF cannot be decided simply on the basis of labeling ORDA 
as a "successor employer". The real question is whether, on 
the particular facts of the case, and in light of the 
policies of the Act and those implicit in the Public 
Authorities Law. ORDA is obligated to recognize and negotiate 
with PEF for a unit of employees consisting of seasonal ski 
instructors and one supervisor employed at Gore, and is bound 
by the State-PEF contract. Unquestionably, under the 
"continuity of enterprise" test, ORDA is a "successor 
employer" in the sense that it succeeded to the operations of 
11172 
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Gore, formerly operated by the State, and performs those 
operations essentially in the same manner. Nevertheless, 
ORDA has recognized a unit of all employees at its various 
facilities, including the seasonal ski instructors at both 
Gore and Whiteface. There is no basis for a finding that a 
unit consisting solely of former PS&T Unit titles at Gore is 
a "most appropriate" unit. For reasons entirely unrelated to 
the operations of ORDA, these positions were included in a 
Statewide unit of the Executive Branch of the State of New 
York. While these positions may have been appropriately 
placed in the PS&T Unit, there is no basis relating to ORDA's 
operations for concluding that these employees should 
continue to have separate unit status. 
PEF urges that our decision in City of Amsterdam, supra, 
requires a different result. We there found that the City 
was the successor of two separate employers in the operation 
of its water and sewer plants and was required to deal with 
the unions that represented the employees of its two 
predecessors in the pre-existing negotiating units. In that 
case we dealt with the transfer of discrete, complete units. 
We concluded that these former units, taken over in whole by 
the City, represented the most appropriate unit structure. 
The uniting question presented here, however, is vastly 
different. This case does not involve consideration 
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of a discrete unit of employees transferred from one employer 
to another. PEF seeks here to follow some 40 members of the 
PS&T Unit, and asks us to ignore the standards of CSL §207.1 
insofar as ORDA is concerned. PEF clearly misapprehends its 
rights under the Taylor Law. Nothing in the Act guarantees 
continuing representation rights under the circumstances 
disclosed by this record.— 
Finding no legal obligation by the State or ORDA to 
recognize or negotiate with PEF concerning the former PS&T 
Unit employees nor any obligation on the part of ORDA to 
comply with the State-PEF contract, we cannot sustain any of 
the alleged improper practices set forth in PEF's charge. 
ACCORDINGLY. WE ORDER that that charge must be, and it 
hereby is. dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: September 17, 1987 
Albany, New York 
ii^We need not reach the issue whether, if ORDA had 
assumed a substantial portion of the PS&T Unit, it would have 
had an obligation to negotiate with PEF. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Miriam 
Soffer (charging party) to a decision of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director), 
which dismissed an improper practice charge alleging a 
violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by the City University of New York 
(Queens College) (employer) and of §209-a.2(a) of the Act by 
the Professional Staff Congress/CUNY (PSC). The charge 
alleges that the employer and PSC violated the provisions of 
the Act by negotiating a modification of the workload 
provision of their September 1. 1984 to August 31, 1987 
11175 
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collective bargaining agreement mid-contract term without 
obtaining ratification thereof by the bargaining unit, which 
occasioned adverse effect on some members and, in particular, 
Soffer. The Director dismissed so much of the charge as 
~—a-1-l-e-g-e-d—a—v-i-o-l-ation— o#—§2-0-9—a-.-l<-e-)—o-f—the—Acitujip-0:n_tw-o -—. 
grounds. First, the collective bargaining agreement had not, 
at the time of filing of the charge, expired, such that 
§209-a.l(e) has no applicability to a mid-contract term 
renegotiation of a provision of the collective bargaining 
agreement.- The second ground for dismissal of the 
§209-a.l(e) charge by the Director was that an individual 
employee has no standing to allege a violation of that 
provision of the Act, since the bargaining agent, and not an 
individual employee, is the party to the negotiating process 
which the section is designed to protect and, accordingly, 
only a bargaining agent would have standing to allege a 
violation of the Act in this regard. 
For the reasons set forth in the decision of the 
Director, together with the cases cited therein, we affirm the 
dismissal of the charge against the employer, as not 
^Section 209-a.l(e) of the Act makes it an improper 
practice for an employer to refuse to "continue all the 
terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement is 
negotiated . . . ." (Emphasis supplied) 
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constituting a violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Act.~ 
In her exceptions to the Director's decision, charging 
party asserts that the issue before the Director, and the 
issue before us, is as follows: "Should a secretive 
_ mbd-tf-i-eati-on-of- -a—wo-r-ki-o-ad—provi s ian_:whicJh_go-verns—actual _^_ 
workload, be considered valid although a valid provision 
exists, and although none of the [approval mechanisms] to the 
ratification process were involved?" (exceptions, para. No. 3) 
The Director found that §209-a.2(a) of the Act contains 
no per se requirement that ratification of either a 
collective bargaining agreement, or the modification of a 
collective bargaining agreement, take place. In other words, 
the Director found, and we agree, that ratification of a 
•^ -/Although we have not previously addressed the 
question of whether an individual has standing to claim a 
violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Act. various Administrative 
Law Judge decisions have done so. citing as support 
therefor the fact that we have previously found that only 
bargaining agents, and not their individual members, have 
standing to charge a violation of §209-a.l(d). and the 
opinion that the principles underlying those decisions 
apply equally to cases involving §209-a.l(e). See, e.g. 
Clarkstown CSD. 17 PERB ir4600 (1984). which relies upon our 
decisions in State of New York (Robinson). 13 PERB ir3063 
(1980) and East Ramapo CSD. 12 PERB V3121 (1979). We agree 
with the reasoning in these decisions and hereby adopt the 
finding that only bargaining agents, and not their 
individual members have standing to claim violations of 
§209-a.l(e) of the Act. 
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collective bargaining agreement is not a requirement of the 
Act. See Public Employees Federation. AFL-CIO (Muraqali). 14 
PERB ir303 6 (1981). In the absence of any claim by charging 
party of improper motivation or other impropriety in the 
— —-man-n-e-r— in—which -ESC^ C-OJidug^ ted--_or determined not to conduct a 
ratification vote, there can be no violation of §209-a.2(a) 
of the Act solely by virtue of the failure to conduct a 
ratification vote on a mid-contract term modification. The 
Director's decision is, accordingly, affirmed in this regard. 
A second contention raised by charging party is that the 
PSC violated §209-a.2(a) just by negotiating a mid-contract 
modification of the existing collective bargaining 
agreement. Again, in the absence of any factual allegation 
of improper motivation for negotiating a contract 
modification, there is no prohibition under the Act against 
mid-contract term negotiations and contract modification. 
The decision of the Director is, accordingly, affirmed in 
this regard also. While the parties to the collective 
bargaining agreement may have had no duty to negotiate, 
mid-term, a contract modification, nothing in the Act 
precludes such negotiations and modification from taking 
place. 
We have reviewed the remaining exceptions raised by 
charging party and they raise issues which have been 
properly addressed by the Director in his decision. 
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Affirming, as we do, the findings of the Director, together 
with his reasoning therefor, the exceptions are dismissed in 
their entirety, and the decision of the Director is hereby 
affirmed. 
— —-FT-I-S-JTHEREFORE-ORDERED-tha-t--the-eha-rge^be,-and-i-t- — 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: September 17. 1987 
Albany. New York 
^ e A > 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Samuel 
Kimmel. charging party, to the dismissal of an improper 
practice charge filed by him against the United Federation of 
Teachers (UFT), alleging a violation of §209-a.2(a) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). Kimmel, a 
guidance counselor employed by the Board of Education of the 
City School District of the City of New York, alleges that 
his UFT representative failed to take action on his behalf 
concerning his supervision by other employees who, according 
to Kimmel, had not been properly appointed in a supervisory-
capacity. Additionally, Kimmel alleges that he was given 
insufficient assistance in his efforts to obtain a transfer 
to a school closer to his home. 
11180 
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The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) requested and 
received two letters of clarification of the original charge 
from Kimmel. In these writings. Kimmel described the two 
separate problems which, he alleged, were inadequately 
addressed by UFT. in violation of its duty of fair 
representation. 
Following receipt of Kimmel's letters of clarification, 
the ALJ determined that the charge failed to state a cause of 
action which, even if proven, would constitute a violation of 
§209-a.2(a) of the Act, and dismissed the charge without a 
hearing. Kimmel excepts to the ALJ dismissal on the grounds, 
among others, that it was based upon his admission that he 
did not request the filing of a grievance, but merely assumed 
it would be filed, when, in fact, it was not. Although he 
does not deny making the admission, Kimmel asserts in his 
exceptions that elsewhere in his submissions he also alleged 
to the ALJ that he specifically requested that a grievance be 
filed on his behalf, and that the dismissal of his charge was 
based upon a finding of fact which should only have been made 
after a hearing. He asserts a failure of the UFT to file a 
grievance on his behalf, coupled with a failure to 
communicate with him concerning his grievance or any decision 
not to file a grievance. 
In connection with his claim that UFT failed to achieve 
his transfer to a school closer to his home, Kimmel 
acknowledged that he neither filed a grievance himself nor 
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requested that the union do so. Furthermore, UFT 
investigated the transfer request issue, and informed Kimmel 
that there were no openings in a school closer to his home to 
which he could transfer; that other, more senior, employees 
were ahead of him on the transfer list, who would be 
considered ahead of Kimmel if an opening existed; and that, 
in any event, transfers lie within the discretion of 
management and are not subject to the UFT's control. The ALJ 
determined that the charge set forth no basis upon which it 
could be claimed that the UFT's failure to proceed further 
with Kimmel's request for a transfer was grossly negligent, 
irresponsible or improperly motivated.— She accordingly 
found that the claims made by Kimmel with regard to the 
transfer issue failed to state a charge which, even if 
proven, would constitute a violation of §209-a.2(a) of the 
Act. Kimmel's exceptions to this aspect of the ALJ decision 
provide no basis for disturbing the ALJ's finding and the 
dismissal of so much of the charge as alleges a breach of the 
duty of fair representation with respect to Kimmel's efforts 
to obtain a transfer is. accordingly, affirmed. 
The second issue raised by Kimmel in his charge, and the 
clarifications thereof, relates to the claim that he was 
i/See. Hauppauge Schools Office Staff Ass'n. 18 PERB 
1P029 (1985); Nassau Educational Chapter. Syosset CSD Unit. 
CSEA. Inc.. 11 PERB 1f30l0 (1978). 
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being supervised by persons not possessing the authority to 
supervise him. Kimmel cites no provision of the collective 
bargaining agreement between UFT and the employer as having 
been violated by this alleged improper supervision nor has he 
made any specific claim as to the reasons why he believes 
such supervision is improper. However, Kimmel asserts that 
he had correspondence with UFT in June 1986 concerning this 
issue. In the June correspondence, UFT informed Kimmel that, 
based upon its investigation, his supervisor possessed the 
necessary qualifications to act in a supervisory capacity. 
Kimmel, being dissatisfied with this response, met with Tom 
Pappas. a UFT representative, on July 10, 1986, and discussed 
^ ) the issue further. There is, in fact, a discrepancy in the 
written allegations made by Kimmel concerning whether, at the 
July 10 meeting, he actually requested that UFT file a 
grievance on his behalf in this regard, or whether he merely 
assumed that a grievance would be filed on his behalf 
concerning the issue. 
In any event. Kimmel claims that at the July 10 meeting 
with Pappas. he requested additional investigation of the 
matter and/or a grievance, and that Pappas agreed to get back 
to him. Additionally. Kimmel claims that Pappas never did 
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On the other hand, he does acknowledge, in his 
clarification of the charge, that he had a phone conversation 
with Pappas on September 10. 1986. Although denying that the 
supervision issue was discussed, Kimmel admits that shortly-
after the September 10 conversation, he "realized" that UFT 
would not be pursuing the issue further, by way of grievance 
or otherwise. 
It is now well settled that a union may breach its duty 
of fair representation under §209-a.2(a) of the Act by 
refusing to process a grievance in a manner which constitutes 
an arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct. Smith v. 
Sipe. 67 N.Y.2d 928. 19 PERB ir7507 (1986); UFT (Dubin) . 
18 PERB 1f3026 (1985). It is also well settled that a union 
may breach its duty of fair representation by failing to 
communicate with a unit member concerning matters affecting 
terms and conditions of employment. Nassau Ed. Chapter. 
Syosset CSD Unit. CSEA, Inc..supra. Whether either of these 
duties has been breached has yet to be determined in this 
case. Taking Kimmel's allegations in a light most favorable 
to him (as we must in considering whether dismissal prior to 
hearing should be ordered), we cannot say. however, as a 
matter of law, that Kimmel has so completely failed to state 
a cause of action in his charge and clarifications thereof as 
to require dismissal of the charge at this stage of the 
Board - U-9135 -6 
proceedings. We agree with Kimmel that his claim that he 
requested that a grievance be filed should have been credited 
by the ALJ in determining whether dismissal prior to a 
hearing was warranted. We also agree that a finding is 
necessary to determine whether UFT improperly failed to 
respond or unduly delayed in responding to Kimmel's request 
for a grievance and/or additional investigation of his claim 
of improper supervision. 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ's dismissal 
of the charge and remand it for further findings concerning, 
among other things, whether a grievance was requested and 
whether an improper failure to communicate with Kimmel 
concerning his complaint and/or grievance occurred. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be. and it 
hereby is. remanded to the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this decision and order. 
DATED: September 17, 1987 
Albany, New York 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Herkimer 
County BOCES Teachers Association (Association) from the 
dismissal of its charge by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
upon the ground that the Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) is without jurisdiction over the charge, based upon 
§205.5(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
Section 205.5(d) prohibits PERB from exercising "jurisdiction 
over an alleged violation of [a collective bargaining] 
agreement that would not otherwise constitute an improper 
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In its charge, the Association alleges that the Herkimer 
County Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) 
violated §§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Act when it increased unit 
employees' instructional duties by 24 minutes per day and 
decreased their free/unassigned time by an identical amount. 
BOCES. in its answer to the charge, asserts that the 
Association had already filed a contract grievance on behalf of 
its bargaining unit members, claiming that the increase in 
instructional duty time violated several provisions of the 
collective bargaining agreement between the parties.— BOCES 
pointed out that, in its demand for arbitration of the 
grievance, the Association described the nature of the dispute 
as follows: "The BOCES increased teachers' work time without 
agreement with the Union and without additional pay to the 
affected teachers." The remedy sought in the demand for 
arbitration was "that the District immediately return to old 
i^The contract grievance, dated December 2, 1986, alleges 
that Articles XVI.A and XIV.2.4 were violated, and states the 
facts as follows: 
The District announced on September 2, 1986 that 
a new work schedule for occupational education 
teachers would go into effect immediately. This 
new work schedule required occupational education 
teachers to teach 117 additional hours per year 
and at the same time reduces by a similar amount 
their unscheduled time. The District should 
either reduce scheduled teaching time of those 
affected by 117 hours per year or pay a 
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schedule and compensate on a pro-rated basis all teachers 
whose work time was increased." 
The Association's charge makes essentially the same 
allegation. It asserts that 
[t]he effective work time was increased by 
—
:
— twen^ y-f-our—(-24)™m-inu^ tes-per—dayv-wh-tl-e= — 
free/unassigned time was decreased by 
twenty-four (24) minutes per day. The total 
length of the school day was unchanged. 
As a remedy, the Association requests PERB to 
order the employer to: (a) cease and desist 
the implementation of the new work times; 
(b) restore the status quo (pre-September 2) 
until such time as the parties negotiate and 
reach agreement; (c) make whole all affected 
employees for the additional work time 
required by the unilateral schedule change. 
In considering the jurisdictional defense raised by 
BOCES to the charge, the ALJ concluded that, because the 
factual basis for and remedy sought in both the grievance and 
in the improper practice charge were the same, PERB was 
without jurisdiction of the charge, and dismissed it. The 
dismissal was specifically without regard to the likelihood 
of success on the merits of the grievance and was based 
exclusively upon the fact that the charging party had. by 
filing a grievance, alleged a violation of its collective 
bargaining agreement and. by doing so, divested PERB of its 
jurisdiction [Act, §205.5(d)]. In dismissing the charge, the 
ALJ also found that the absence of any reference to the 
grievance by the charging party in its improper practice 
charge was of no moment in evaluating the question of whether 
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the contract grievance filed by the charging party 
constituted a bar to PERB's jurisdiction. The ALJ found that 
whether the existence of a contract grievance is revealed by 
the charge or in some other manner is immaterial to 
determining PERB's jurisdiction. 
In our view, the ALJ properly refused to consider the 
merits of the contract grievance filed by the Association in 
assessing PERB's jurisdiction, and also properly considered 
the fact that a contract grievance had been filed without 
regard to which party raised it as an issue. 
However, it remains to be determined whether, as found 
by the ALJ, the filing of a contract grievance automatically 
takes the action complained of outside the scope of PERB's 
jurisdiction. The mere act of filing a contract grievance by 
a charging party which alleges the same facts as an improper 
practice charge does not necessarily constitute an 
irrevocable and exclusive election of forums which divests 
PERB of jurisdiction. Whether a grievance filed under the 
collective bargaining agreement actually covers the subject 
addressed in the improper practice charge presents us with no 
reason to deal with any possible improper practice charge in 
this case at this time. Instead, examination into the 
question of whether the parties' agreement in fact covers the 
issue raised by the improper practice charge must be made 
before a jurisdictional question under §205.5(d) of the Act 
is reached. We believe that it is appropriate to defer 
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deciding whether §205.5(d) of the Act precludes the exercise 
of jurisdiction by PERB, pending the outcome of the grievance 
which has been filed. Presumably, if the arbitrator assigned 
to hear the grievance were to determine, on valid grounds, 
that the issue of extension of working time of employees, 
with commensurate reduction in their free time during the 
working day, is not covered by the collective bargaining 
agreement (as opposed to being not violative of the 
collective bargaining agreement), then PERB would have 
jurisdiction over the alleged unilateral change in terms and 
2/ 
conditions of employment.- While PERB would not be bound 
by a determination of an arbitrator insofar as its own 
jurisdiction is concerned, an award finding, on sound 
grounds, no contract coverage would be accorded substantial 
weight, assuming that the criteria contained in our decision 
in New York City Transit Authority. 4 PERB 1f303l (1971), have 
been met. If, on the other hand, an arbitrator should rule 
either that the action complained of by the Association 
violates the collective bargaining agreement, or that the 
issue is covered by the parties' contract negotiations 
.2/ln fact, the Association argues that its grievance 
does not claim that the District is prohibited by "the 
agreement" from extending working time without extending the 
workday, but that it claims an obligation to increase teacher 
pay if it can and does increase work time. It therefore 
argues that the contract violation and charge differ as to the 
wrong alleged and the applicable remedy. 
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but does not violate the terms of their agreement, a finding of 
lack of jurisdiction may be appropriate. In either event, 
substantial weight, again assuming that the New York City 
Transit Authority criteria are met. would be given to the 
arbitration decision and PERB would find that it is without 
jurisdiction of the actions complained of in the improper 
practice charge. 
It appears to us that deferral of the question of whether 
PERB has jurisdiction over an improper practice charge when 
there is a pending contract grievance is a more equitable 
result than outright dismissal of the charge with prejudice. 
This is so because the public policy against permitting a party 
to proceed in two separate forums on the merits of its claims 
would still be protected. A union seeking, in good faith, to 
protect its bargaining unit members from a perceived 
transgression of employee rights, whether they be contractual 
or Taylor Law rights, is an appropriate exercise of the duty of 
fair representation. As a practical matter. PERB would still, 
following issuance of an arbitration award, make its own 
independent determination as to whether it has jurisdiction of 
the pending charge. If an arbitrator rules that the issue was 
covered by the collective bargaining agreement, whether 
violative of it or not, PERB could then determine, based in 
part on the arbitration award, that it was without jurisdiction 
of the improper practice charge pursuant to §205.5(d) of the 
Act. If an arbitrator finds that an issue addressed in 
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a contract grievance is simply not covered by the collective 
bargaining agreement, the Association would not be precluded 
from proceeding on behalf of its bargaining unit members to 
attempt to persuade PERB that it does in fact have jurisdiction 
over the issue. Deferral of the determination of PERB's 
jurisdiction accordingly is an appropriate procedure which will 
not be unduly burdensome on an employer, while still providing 
some opportunity for a union to obtain a determination on the 
merits of a perceived adverse employment decision in those 
circumstances in which the contract coverage is unclear. 
The Association also argues in its exceptions that the ALJ 
erred in dismissing the portion of the charge which alleged a 
violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Act. The ALJ dismissed that 
portion of the charge upon the ground that no separate 
allegation of improper motive or interference with Taylor Law 
rights was made and, therefore, the alleged violation derives 
wholly from the unilateral change allegation. Furthermore, the 
ALJ found that the increase in employees' assigned teaching 
time is not, as a matter of law, so inherently destructive of 
their exercise of statutory rights as to constitute a per se 
violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Act. 
In Connetguot CSD, 19 PERB 1F3045 (1986), we considered the 
question of whether the granting of benefits in excess of the 
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement constitutes a 
violation of §209-a.l(a) as well as a possible violation of the 
Board - U-9160 -8 
collective bargaining agreement. In that case, we concluded 
that a significant distinction exists between a breach of an 
agreement resulting in a lesser benefit to bargaining unit 
members, and a breach of an agreement resulting in a greater 
benefit than contained in the collective bargaining agreement. 
We stated the following: 
Where benefits are provided that are less 
than what is called for in a collective 
bargaining agreement, the appropriate remedy-
is an action in court or the initiation of a 
grievance. However, the provision of 
benefits that are more than what is called 
for in a collective bargaining agreement is 
inherently destructive of a union's 
representation rights. It can be construed 
to give a message that the unit employees 
would do better if they abandoned their 
union. An implicit promise of benefits in 
such terms would violate §209-a.l(a) of the 
Taylor Law. 
In the instant case, the claim made by the Association 
is that bargaining unit members are now receiving a lesser 
benefit than the collective bargaining unit requires, and no 
claim is made that the employer's action was initiated with 
the purpose and intent of undermining the union in its 
representational capacity. 
We view the facts and circumstances of the instant case 
as being readily distinguishable from the facts set forth in 
Connetquot CSD. id., and we find that the ALJ properly 
dismissed so much of the charge as alleged a violation of 
§209-a.l(a) of the Act because the charge failed to state a 
prima facie case. In view of our affirmance on this ground. 
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we need not address the other ground for his dismissal of 
the charge in this respect. 
IT IS TFIEREFORE ORDERED TPIAT the dismissal of so much 
of the charge as alleges a violation of §209-a.l(a) of the 
Act is hereby affirmed, and that portion of the charge is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the determination of PERB's 
jurisdiction over so much of the charge as alleges a 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act is deferred, and the 
charge is conditionally dismissed, with opportunity to the 
Association to file a timely motion to the Director at the 
conclusion of the contract grievance procedure to reopen the 
charge upon the ground that the jurisdictional limitations 
contained in §205.5(d) of the Act do not apply to its charge, 
DATED: September 17. 1987 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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#2F-9/17/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
A PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INDIAN RIVER SCHOOL UNIT, JEFFERSON 
COUNTY LOCAL 823. CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION. INC.. LOCAL 1000, AFSCME. 
AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8281 
INDIAN RIVER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent. 
MARJORIE E. KAROWE. GENERAL COUNSEL. CSEA LEGAL 
DEPARTMENT (WILLIAM V. O'LEARY, ESQ.. of Counsel), for 
Charging Party 
WILLMOTT. WISNER, SCANLON. SAUNDERS & HAAS (DANIEL 
SCANLON. JR., of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Indian 
River School Unit, Jefferson County Local 823, Civil Service 
Employees Association. Inc., Local 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing its charge against the Indian River Central School 
District (District). The charge alleged that the District 
violated CSL §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally subcontracting its 
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entire transportation service effective July 1, 1985. The 
ALJ's decision, issued after a hearing, found that over the 
years the District had been contracting out part of its bus 
runs to private contractors, with the percentage of the 
routes that were contracted out steadily increasing from the 
1982-83 school year through the 1984-85 school year. The ALJ 
also found that during the period that part of the work was 
contracted out, the contractors performed the same work as 
unit employees: they drove some regular routes and some 
special routes, the latter consisting of bussing students to 
and from private schools, BOCES, special education, and the 
bussing of handicapped students. This occurred without any 
.' loss of jobs by unit employees. The ALJ concluded that when 
the District contracted out the rest of its bus runs and 
terminated the employees who performed duties in relation to 
them, there was no violation because the work had not been 
exclusively unit work. 
CSEA's exceptions assert that the ALJ erred in finding 
that the contractors in the past had performed the same work 
as that performed by District personnel. The exceptions 
claim that Charging Party's Exhibit 32, and the testimony of 
one witness. Campany, show that prior to the 1985-86 year, 
the contractors only drove the special routes. 
Our review of the record, including Charging Party's 
Exhibit 32 and Carlyle T. Campany's testimony, shows that the 
) 
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private contractors did drive regular bus routes as well as 
special bus routes, as found by the ALJ. Particularly, 
Charging Party's Exhibit 39, the exhibit upon which the ALJ's 
decision based its summary of routes driven by District 
employees and contractors, shows that a substantial number of 
routes which appear to be regular ones had been contracted 
out.- Thus, as found by the ALJ. "there is no discernable 
boundary which would set apart the bus routes operated by the 
District employees from those operated by the private 
contractors" so as to enable us to conclude that the 
2/ District employees perform particular work exclusively.— 
Since the transportation services furnished by the 
District were not exclusively unit work, we conclude, as did 
the ALJ, that the District's contracting out of the entire 
* • 3/ service was not improper.— 
i/we note that in its brief to the ALJ. CSEA relies 
on Charging Party Exhibit 39 and makes no claim that only 
special routes had been contracted out. 
^Town of West Seneca. 19 PERB ir3028 (1986). 
I/County of Erie. 17 PERB ir4551. aff'd. 17 PERB 1f3067 
(1984). See also Niagara Frontier Transportation 
Authority. 18 PERB 1P083 (1985); Guilderland CSD. 16 PERB 
ir3038 (1983); Deer Park UFSD. 15 PERB 1P104 (1982). 
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NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 17, 1987 
Albany, New York 
KJ2yc^*o(Oi^^ 
rold R. Newman, Chairman 
r. 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member, 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.. 
LOCAL 1000. AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9016 
NEWBURGH ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
CSEA LAW DEPARTMENT (MARJORIE E. KAROWE. ESQ.. General 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
DAVID S. SHAW. ESQ. (DAVID S. SHAW. ESQ. and GARRETT 
L. SILVEIRA. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Newburgh Enlarged City School District (District) to the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which 
sustained the charge of the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO (CSEA) that 
the District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally required 
certain unit employees to record their presence at their 
workplace on a time clock. 
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FACTS 
The parties stipulated that on July 17, 1986, for the 
first time, and without prior negotiations with CSEA, the 
District required unit members employed at the District's 
library to record on a "time clock" their arrival at the 
beginning of the workday and their departure at the end of 
the workday, as well as their departure for and arrival from 
lunch. The parties further stipulated that, since at least 
April. 1984, said unit employees were only required to record 
their arrival at the beginning of the workday by signing or 
marking a sheet bearing their printed names. The record also 
established that there are 40 to 50 part-time unit members 
among the 75 employed at the District's library, and that 
these part-time employees have, since 1984, been required to 
record their attendance by noting on a "master sheet" the 
number of hours they worked each day, at the end of their 
workday. 
The parties further stipulated that the new procedure 
has not curtailed unit members' free time or extended the 
length of the workday. - The record also establishes that the 
District instituted the new recording requirements because 
they were thought necessary in order to comply with the 
recordkeeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
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ALJ DECISION 
The ALJ determined that, while the mere substitution of 
the time clock for previous manual recording of attendance 
was not a negotiable change in terms and conditions of 
employment, the imposition of additional recording 
requirements on the unit employees beyond those required by 
past practice constituted a negotiable change in terms and 
conditions of employment. Therefore, he ordered the District 
to rescind its policy of requiring unit members to record 
their times of arrival at and departure from their workplace, 
"except insofar as such recording is a mechanical 
substitution for that which said unit members had performed 
once each day prior to July 17, 1986". 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the District asserts that the ALJ 
failed to apply a balancing test to determine whether the 
additional recording requirements imposed a sufficient impact 
on terms and conditions of employment to warrant a finding of 
negotiability in light of the asserted important managerial 
interests in complying with the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
in controlling its employees' attandance. The District also 
asserts that inasmuch as unit members had previously been 
required to record their attendance once a day. "the 
threshold of participation" has been passed and the "slight 
increase" in participation revealed by this record did not 
constitute a negotiable change. 
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DISCUSSION 
We affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
It is undisputed that the District has unilaterally 
increased the extent of the unit members' participation in 
the recording process, as well as instituting the use of a 
"time clock". The District urges that the extent of the 
increased participation of the employees is minimal and does 
not constitute a negotiable change in terms and conditions of 
employment. 
The District's basic managerial right to maintain a 
record of attendance and presence of its employees is not in 
issue. That right exists by virtue of its accountability for 
the expenditure of public funds and for the acts of its 
employees. The maintenance of such a record by the employer 
is beyond the scope of mandatory negotiations. An employer 
may not, however, without agreement of the employees' 
negotiating representative, require its employees to 
participate in the recording process. Applying our usual 
balancing test, we conclude that the clear and direct primary 
impact of such a work rule is on conditions of employment and 
not upon essential managerial responsibilities.— Thus, 
the imposition of such a work rule is a negotiable change in 
terms and conditions of employment. It is the imposition 
1/Police Association of New Rochelle, New York. Inc.. 
13 PERB ir3082 (1980) . 
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of the work rule, not the use of a time clock, which must be 
negotiated. Where a work rule has been in effect requiring 
employees to participate in the managerial function of 
recording their attendance and presence, and such work rule 
continues unchanged, the mere substitution of a mechanical 
device for the manual means of recordation is not a 
2/ 
negotiable change in terms and conditions of employment.— 
The change in work rule at issue herein is from a 
once-a-day recording of attendance to the recording of 
arrival and departure and, for those employees affected, the 
recording of departure and arrival at lunch time. The 
primary impact of such change continues to be on conditions 
of employment. We reject the District's contention that the 
once-a-day recording of attendance constitutes a "threshold" 
beyond which further participation in the recording process 
should be left solely to the employer to determine. We are 
not persuaded that the interests of the employer warrant 
permitting it to impose unilaterally additional recordkeeping 
responsibilities on employees solely because there is already 
some employee participation in the recording process. 
^See Hampton Bays SD, 10 PERB V4596 (1977); Island 
Trees UFSD. 10 PERB 1F4590 (1977). Cf. Nathan Littauer 
Hospital Association. 229 NLRB No. 166. 95 LRRM 1296 (1977) 
and Rustcraft Broadcasting. 225 NLRB No. 65. 92 LRRM 1576 
(1976) . 
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We also reject the District's reliance on the Fair Labor 
Standards Act as a sufficient reason for permitting 
unilateral action by the District. The recent application of 
that Act to public employers did not change the basic 
responsibilities of a public employer regarding the 
maintenance of a record of attendance of its employees. The 
recordkeeping requirements of that Act do not justify 
management's unilateral delegation of its responsibilities to 
the unit members. 
Accordingly, we find that the District violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act by failing to negotiate with CSEA 
concerning the additional recording requirements imposed upon 
unit members employed at its library. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER the Newburgh Enlarged City 
School District: 
1. To rescind its policy of requiring unit members 
to record their times of arrival and departure 
at their workplace, except insofar as such 
recording is a mechanical substitution for that 
which said unit members had performed once each 
day prior to July 17. 1986; 
2. To expunge any personnel records derived from 
the extended recording system; 
3. To negotiate in good faith with CSEA concerning 
unit members' terms and conditions of 
employment; and 
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DATED: 
4. To sign and post the attached notice at all 
locations customarily used to post notices to 
unit members. 
September 17. 1987 
Albany, New York 
'Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Y. 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
APPENDIX 
OTICE10 ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of tht 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify ,, . • «.^  •*. ^ * ^ *.*. „• •-. all employees in the unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association. Inc.. Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) that the Newburgh Enlarged City School District: 
1. Will rescind its policy of requiring unit 
members employed at its library to record their 
times of arrival and departure at their workplace..., 
except insofar as such recording is a mechanical 
substitution for that which said unit members had 
performed once each day prior to July 17, 1986; 
2. Will expunge any personnel records derived 
from the extended recording system; and 
3. Will negotiate in good faith with CSEA con-
cerning unit members' terms and conditions of 
employment. 
NEWBURGH ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated By 
(RtpraMntativt) CTltte) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2H-9/17/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent. 
__ ^  :-and-: : „ _ _ CASE NO. U-8 347 
THOMAS C. BARRY. 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8664 
MORRIS E. ESON. 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8795 




In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent, 
-and- : • CASE NO. U-8890 
GORDON GALLUP, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8859 
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party. 
BERNARD F. ASHE. ESQ. (IVOR MOSKOWITZ. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Respondent, in Case Nos. U-8347. 
U-8664, U-8795. U-8890 & U-8859 
THOMAS C. BARRY. pro. se, in Case Nos. U-8347 & U-8859 
GLENN M. TAUBMAN. ESQ.. National Right to Work Legal 
Defense Foundation, for Charging Parties, in 
Case Nos. U-8664. U-8795 & U-8890 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
In our Decision of July 8, 1987, we determined that the 
( 
agency shop fee refund procedure of the United University 
Professions (UUP) for the years 1984-85. 1985-86 and 1986-87 
-3-
violated §§209-a.2(a) and 208.3(a) of the Act in certain 
specified particulars. We ordered UUP to submit within 30 
days a revised agency shop fee refund procedure which would 
be in conformity with our Decision, together with steps for 
immediate implementation thereof. 
UUP has submitted a procedure which, as subsequently 
amended, is set forth in the Appendix to this Decision. 
Having reviewed this proposed procedure, we conclude that 
it remedies the violations found by us except in the 
following respect.— 
Prior to determining the advance reduction, the 
proposed procedure obligates UUP to submit to the agency 
fee payers, no later than April 1, an audited statement of 
chargeable and nonchargeable expenditures. However, taking 
into account both constitutional and statutory obligations, 
this Board has previously found, and here confirms, that 
the information to be submitted to agency fee payers should 
include not only an audited statement of chargeable and 
I/with regard to the "Final Determination of Refund 
and Appeal" provisions of its procedure, the UUP has agreed 
to amend its proposal by adding language which will make 
clear that it retains the burden of proof but that, for 
purposes of issue identification, the objector should 
indicate the general categories of expenditures which are 
being challenged. 
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nonchargeable expenditures, but an audited statement of 
income and expenditures for the operative fiscal year. 
We accept UUP's amended procedure subject, however, to 
the condition that it change its procedure to provide for 
the furnishing of such additional financial information. If 
UUP does not notify us within 10 days of receipt of this 
Decision that it accepts such change, UUP's agency fee 
procedure will be found to be deficient and we shall take 
whatever appropriate action we deem necessary in light of 
the failure of UUP to establish and maintain an acceptable 
2/ agency fee refund procedure.— 
UUP proposes to implement its new procedure for the 
1988-89 fiscal year which commences September 1, 1988. In 
addition, it has agreed to implement the "Final 
Determination of Refund and Appeal" provision of the new 
3/ procedure in its 1987-88 Agency Fee Refund Procedure.— 
i/uUP has advised that it has placed all agency fee 
monies received after September 1, 1987 in a separate 
interest-bearing account and that it will maintain these 
monies in such account until the final approval or 
disapproval of UUP's proposed procedure. Because of the 
separate holding out of these monies and its several 
efforts to come into compliance, an immediate suspension is 
not required. 
^Many of the deficiencies found in our July 8 
Decision are also present in UUP's 1987-88 procedure. 
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It also advises that it has furnished to agency fee payers 
who filed objections for the 1987-88 fiscal year an 
advance reduction which includes the 10 percent cushion 
required by the 1988-89 procedure. In these 
circumstances, UUP's program of implementation is 
reasonable and is accepted. 
UUP has submitted a Motion for Reconsideration of our 
decision of July 8. We have reviewed UUP's submissions 
and find no basis to alter our decision. Accordingly. 
UUP's Motion for Reconsideration is denied in all respects 
WE. THEREFORE. ORDER THAT: 
1. The revised agency fee refund procedure of 
UUP. set forth in the Appendix to this 
Decision, is approved subject, however, to the 
condition that UUP amend such procedure in the 
manner required by this Decision; 
2. UUP notify this Board within 10 days of 
receipt of this decision whether it will make 
the change directed herein; 
3. If UUP fails to accept such change, the extant 
and revised agency fee refund procedure shall 
be deemed deficient; 
11211 
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4. UUP's motion for reconsideration be, and it 
hereby is, denied in all respects. 
DATED: September 17, 1987 
-------—--A-l-b-a^ y-T-^ New-Yo-r-k----
/ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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APPENDIX 
AGENCY FEE REFUND PROCEDURES FOR THE 19 88-89 FISCAL YEAR 
Any person making service payments to the Union in lieu of 
dues, pursuant to Chapter 677. Laws of 1977, as amended by 
Chapter 678. Laws of 1977 and Chapter 122. Laws of 1978. shall 
._ have the right to object to the expenditure of any_ paxt^of_the_ 
agency fee which represents the employee's pro-rata share of 
expenditures by the Union or its affiliates (hereinafter 
"Union") in aid of activities or causes of a political or 
ideological nature only incidentally related to terms and 
conditions of employment. 
Such objections shall be made, if at all, by the objector 
individually notifying the Union President of his/her objection 
by mail during the period between April 15 and May 15 of the 
year prior to the fiscal year of the Union to which the 
objection applies. 
The agency fee of such objectors shall be reduced for the 
next fiscal year by the approximate proportion of the agency 
fees spent by the Union for such purposes, based on the latest 
fiscal year for which there is a completed and available 
audited financial statement. An audited statement of the 
Union's chargeable and non-chargeable expenditures, based on 
the fiscal year, shall be mailed to each agency fee payer no 
later than April 1 of any fiscal year. An objector shall be 
provided prior to the beginning of the new fiscal year with an 
advance payment equal to the amount of the reduction, together 
11213 
-2-
with an explanation as to how such advance reduction was 
calculated. A cushion of ten percent (10%) shall be added to 
each advance payment. 
APPEAL OF ADVANCE REDUCTION 
If an objector is dissatisfied with the amount or 
appropriateness of the reduced fee, he/she may appeal that 
determination in writing and send it to the Union President by 
mail within thirty (30) days following receipt of the advance 
reduction. At such time, the objector must indicate to the 
Union President the percent of agency fees which he/she 
believes are reasonably in dispute. Such amount, but in no 
event more than 100% of the agency fee paid by the objector, 
will be placed in escrow in an interest bearing savings account 
to be established in the Union's name for that purpose. The 
question of appropriateness of the advance reduction will 
thereafter be submitted by the Union to a neutral party 
appointed by the American Arbitration Association for 
expeditious hearing and resolution in accordance with its rules 
for agency fee determinations. The costs for any appeal to a 
neutral party shall be borne by the Union. 
The Union, at its option, may consolidate all appeals and 
have them resolved at one hearing held for such purpose. An 
objector may present his/her appeal in person. 
U214 
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FINAL DETERMINATION OF REFUND AND APPEAL 
At the close of the Union's fiscal year, as soon as 
available, the Union will provide each objector with a copy of 
the audited financial statements, including the final refund 
determination and payment, if any, covering the fiscal year for 
which the objection was made. Within thirty-five (35) days of 
mailing such material, objectors may file objections by mail to 
the Union President from the final refund determination of the 
Union. The objector must indicate the percent of agency fees 
which he/she believes is reasonably in dispute and the general 
categories of expenditures which are being challenged. Such 
amount, but in no event more than 100% of the agency fee. will 
be placed in escrow in an interest bearing savings account to 
be established in the Union's name for that purpose. All 
objections to the final determination will thereafter be 
referred for expeditious hearing and determination to a neutral 
appointed by the American Arbitration Association in accordance 
with its rules for agency fee determinations. The costs for 
any such appeal to a neutral party shall be borne by the Union. 
The Union at its option, may consolidate all appeals and 
have them resolved at one hearing held for such purpose. An 
objector may present his/her appeal in person. 
Nothing shall preclude the union from including appeals 
from the amount of the advance reductions in the same 
-4-
proceeding with appeals from the final determination of 
refund. The neutral, however, will be required to make 
independent findings on each issue. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 887, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS. CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND 
HELPERS OF AMERICA. 
^^iz_3_^.-_:--—^_-j_^--_^r_„. - Petitioner, . — .. _ _ . ; _ .. _ ,__ 
-and-
CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE. CASE NO. C-3232 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 663, NEW YORK COUNCIL 66, AFSCME, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 663. New York Council 
66, AFSCME has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
17217 
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settlement of grievances 
Unit: Included: Unit as defined in January 1, 1985 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (see 
attached list). 
::z
—^ ^^ E^x-el-^ :e"d-:-—-Ai-^ ^ 
FURTHER. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Local 663. New York Council 
66. AFSCME. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 17. 1987 
Albany, New York 
-m+irey'^Afctt i&4^#<^> 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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LABOR GRADE I 
Cleaner B Laborer B 
LABOR GRADE II 
Cleaner A Laborer A 
LABOR GRADE III 
Sewer Maintainer "B" 
Street Maintainer "B 
Community Service Worker 
Semi Skilled Laborer 





Sewer Maintainer "A" 
Street Maintainer "A" 
Assistant Custodian "B" 
Stock Clerk "B" 
LABOR GRADE V 
Assistant Custodian "A" 
Recreation Maintenance Worker 
Stock Clerk "A" 
Traffic Marker 
Weighmaster 
Automotive Stock Clerk 
Community Service Worker II 
LABOR GRADE VI 
Motor Equipment Operator 
Custodian "B" 
Parking Meter Technician 
Skilled Laborer 
Traffic Signal Aide 
LABOR GRADE VII 
Custodian "A" 
Maintenance Worker-Electrical 
Motor Equipment Operator 
(Specialized) 
"B" 
Park Maintenance Man 
Street Light Maintainer 
LABOR GRADE VIII 
Automotive Mechanic 





STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 2300. UNITED AUTO WORKERS. 
Petitioner, 
•— - -and- -- - CASE NO. C-3239 
TOWN OF COVERT. 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 2300, United Auto 
Workers has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All laborers employed in the Highway 
Department in the Town of Covert. 
Excluded: Seasonals and all other employees. 
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Certification - C-3239 page 2 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Local 2300, United Auto 
Workers. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either 
party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to 
a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 17, 1987 
Albany. New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALLEGANY COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO „~ C-322T 




NEW YORK COUNCIL 66 and LOCAL 2574. 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE. COUNTY 
and MUNCIPAL EMPLOYEES. AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Allegany County Deputy 
Sheriff's Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named employer, in the 
unit described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
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purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees employed by the County of 
Allegany and the Sheriff of Allegany 
County in the following job classifica-
- — ^ - - - - — - - - - - - - - - --
correction officer, account clerk 
typist, cook and civil deputy. 
Excluded: Sheriff, undersheriffs and lieutenants, 
temporary employees, part-time employees 
and per diem court deputies. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Allegany County Deputy 
Sheriff's Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 17, 1987 
Albany, New York 
7 H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenbergi—Member 
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